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COMMENTS
The Assertion of Statutory Rights Under FLSA
and OSHA: Expand or Limit the GardnerDenver Rationale
Over two decades ago the United States Supreme Court in
the famous Steelworkers Trilogy1 enunciated a federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Both the Supreme Court2
and the National Labor Relations Board3 (NLRB) on different
occasions have emphasized the importance of collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses by referring labor disputes arising under such agreements back to the parties for arbitration. For a number of years this presumption of arbitrability
was thought to govern labor disputes of almost any kind that
were covered under a valid collective bargaining agreement. The
Supreme Court, however, altered the traditional notions concerning deferral and arbitration when it held in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.' that the presumption of arbitrability does
not extend to Title VIP cases.
In the aftermath of Gardner-Denver, differences of opinion
have arisen among the lower federal courts as to whether the
Gardner-Denver rationale should be strictly limited to Title VII
cases or expanded to encompass labor disputes arising under
other legislation, specifically the Fair Labor Standards Act of
193P (FLSA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
19707 (OSHA). Some lower federal courts have relied upon
Gardner-Denver to permit plaintiffs to exercise FLSA rights
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American'Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2. See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 US. 235 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
4. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 8s 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. 5s 201-219 (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. $5 651-678 (1976).
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without first submitting to grievance-arbitration procedures8
and to exercise OSHA rights following an aribtration award.@In
contrast, other courts have refused to extend the Gardner-Denver rationale to FLSA cases.1° This Comment focuses on
whether the presumption of arbitrability should remain a general rule with a limited Title VII exception or whether the statutorily created rights in FLSA and OSHA should exist independent of grievance-arbitration procedures, thereby warranting de
novo consideration. The conclusion reached here is that the presumption of arbitrability is displaced where Congress expressly
creates independent, statutory rights. Consequently, FLSA and
OSHA rights should not be subordinated to the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements.

A. Presumption of Arbitrability
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, according to the Supreme Court, is rooted in "congressional command."ll The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation
of an existing collective bargaining agreement."l9 The Supreme
Court in Textile Workers Union u. Lincoln MillslS stated that
the purpose behind this policy was to promote industrial peace
and concluded that grievance-arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements further the achievement of this objective." The Court's most emphatic pronouncement on the
8. Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
9. Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
10. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980); Satterwhite v. United Parcel Sew., Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
11. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368,377 (1974). The Court
identified section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
5 173(d) (1976), as the anchor for this "congressional command." Section 203, however,
relates specifically to the functions of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
Subsection (d) declares that "a method agreed upon by the parties" is the "desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes," and that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is available "only as a last resort."
12. 29 U.S.C. 8 173(d) (1976) (this provision relates to the functions of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service).
13. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14. Id. at 455.
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subject, which established the well-known presumption of arbitrability, came in the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy:l5 "An order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."16
Although the Court did explain that this policy favoring grievance-arbitration procedures is essential to our "system of industrial self-government,"17 it never revealed the specific statutory
basis of the policy.18 Instead the Court emphasized that arbitration provides a body of private law to deal with unforeseeable
problems that may arise, and also permits sufficient flexibility to
accommodate the different interests and needs of the parties.lS
15. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
16. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 581.
18. Nowhere in the three decisions comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy does the
Court cite a legislative enactment expressly declaring a federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. It is true that the Court in Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. 368, 377
(1974), relied upon section 203(d) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1976), as the statutory foundation for this federal policy; however, Gateway Coal was decided in 1974 and
the Steelworkers Trilogy was decided fourteen years earlier. If section 203(d), which was
enacted in 1947, in fact served as the statutory basis for the policy, it is difficult to
explain why such an important point was not discussed or even cited in the Court's
definitive Steelworkers Trilogy.
19. The Court elaborated:
The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the
industry and the shop--is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement
although not expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of
the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are
not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that
his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as
the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to
further their common goal of uninterrupted production under the agreement,
to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot
be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the
determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
U.S. at 581-82.
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B. The Deferral Doctrine
For many years the NLRB has adhered to a policy of deferring to the arbitral process. It first announced in Spielberg Manufacturing Co." its minimum standards test for deference to arbitration awards. The NLRB stated that it would recognize an
arbitrator's award provided "the proceedings appear to have
been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and
the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act."" In addition to these
three requirements, the NLRB in subsequent cases added a
fourth criterion that the arbitrator must have considered the
question that formed the basis for the unfair labor practice
brought before the NLRB." The Spielberg deferral policy received favorable comment from the Supreme Courtgsand began
finding acceptance in some pre-arbitral situation^.^^
The NLRB added a significant dimension to the deferral
doctrine when it held in Collyer Insulated Wires6 that disputes
arising out of the meaning or application of a collective bargain20. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
21. Id. a t 1082.
22. Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972); Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific,
195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097
(1961).
23. The Court in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), referred to
the Spielberg deferral policy and then approvingly quoted this statement of the NLRB:
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the subject of
an arbitration proceeding and award. Section 10(a) of the Act expressly makes
this plain, and the courts have uniformly so held. However, it is equally well
established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration
award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor practices if
to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the Act.
The Act, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily designed to promote
industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. Experience has demonstrated that collective-bargaining
agreements that provide for final and binding arbitration of grievance and disputes arising thereunder, "as a substitute for industrial strife," contribute significantly to the attainment of this statutory objective. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26.
Id. at 271.
24. See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969) (NLRB deferred action
on alleged violations of fj 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act before parties had
even resorted to the grievance-arbitration prdcedures of their collective bargaining agreement); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963) (NLRB deferred action on alleged $
8(a)(3) violations pending completion of arbitration ordered by a district court).
25. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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ing agreement that have not been arbitrated may be referred by
the NLRB to arbitration under the provisions of the parties'
agreement. In Collyer a manufacturer and seller of insulated
wire cable was charged with violating its duty as an employer to
bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Acts6 (NLRA) for allegedly having made unilateral changes in
working conditions and wages." Although the contract between
the parties permitted the employer to adjust the wages of its
employees during the contract term and clearly provided that
grievance-arbitration processes would be the exclusive forum for
resolving contract disputes, the union had not invoked the grievance-arbitration machinery before bringing to the NLRB its unfair labor practice charge against the employer. The NLRB concluded that the circumstances in Collyer "weigh[ed] heavily in
favor of deferral,"28 and offered several reasons to support its
decision:
[Tlhis dispute arises within the confines of a long and productive collective-bargaining relationship. The parties before us
have, for 35 years, mutually and voluntarily resolved the conflicts which inhere in collective bargaining. Here, as there, no
claim is made of enmity by [the employer] to employees' exercise of protected rights. [The employer] here has credibly asserted its willingness to resort to arbitration under a clause
providing for arbitration in a very broad range of disputes and
unquestionably broad enough to embrace this dispute.
Finally, here, as in Schlitz, the dispute is one eminently
well suited to resolution by arbitration. The contract and its
meaning in present circumstances lie at the center of this
disp~te.~'

In refutation of a dissenting board member's characterization of deferral as instituting "compulsory arbitration" and allowing parties to be stripped of statutory rights?O the NLRB
26. 29 U.S.C. $3 151-169 (1976). Section 8 (a)(5) of the NLRA is codified at 29
U.S.C. $ 158(a)(5) (1976).
27. The complaint alleged that the employer had unilaterally increased the wage
rates for specific skilled maintenance employees, directed that a single maintenance machinist rather than a team of two perform the worm gear removal and cleaning, and
provided new wage rates for extruder operators. 192 N.L.R.B. at 837.
28. Id. at 840. The NLRB also noted that neither the courts of appeals nor the
Supreme Court had ever questioned its authority to exercise discretion and defer to the
arbitral process.
29. Id. at 842.
30. Id. at 849 (Fanning,Member, dissenting).
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majority stated that it was not compelling arbitration but
"merely giving full effect to [the parties'] own voluntary agreements to submit all such disputes to arbitration, rather than
permitting such agreements to be side-stepped and permitting
the substitution of our processes, a forum not contemplated by
their own agreement."s1 Terming its decision a "developmental
step" in the treatment of pre-arbitral deferral cases, the NLRB
dismissed the complaint but stated that it would retain jurisdiction for the sole purpose of insuring that the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure resolved the dispute in harmony with
the Spielberg standards.32
The year following the NLRB's decision in Collyer, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rios u. Reynolds Metals C O . ~ ~
formulated a more rigorous version of the Spielberg deferral policy for arbitration awards resolving Title VII disputes:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator's decision
is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title
VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied
that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the
collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt
31. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842. The NLRB majority answered the "stripping parties of
statutory rights" argument by stating:
When the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract,
we are of the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to
function. The long and successful functioning of grievance and arbitration procedures suggests to us that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the utilization of such means will resolve the underlying dispute and make it unnecessary
for either party to follow the more formal, and sometimes lengthy, combination
of administrative and judicial litigation provided for under our statute. At the
same time, by our reservation of jurisdiction, infra, we guarantee that there
will be no sacrifice of statutory rights if the parties' own processes fail to function in a manner consistent with the dictates of our law. This approach, we
believe, effectuates the salutary policy announced in Spielberg. . . .
Id. at 842-43.
32. The NLRB retained its right to exercise jurisdiction upon a timely motion for
reconsideration of the complaint based on a showing that the dispute was not amicably
settled or not promptly submitted to arbitration, or that the grievance-arbitrationprocedure had not been fair or regular or had arrived at a result repugnant to the NLRA. Id.
at 843.
33. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
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adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually
decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural
in fir mi tie^.^^

The Supreme Court subsequently held in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver CO.~'that a policy of deferral by federal courts
to prior arbitral decisions in employment discrimination cases
and
would not comport with Title VII congressional obje~tives?~
accordingly rejected the Rios deferral standards.
Concluding that Gardner-Denver only applied to cases involving claims of race or sex discrimination, the NLRB made
. ~ ~
it would
clear in Electronic Reproduction Service C ~ r pthat
continue to defer to arbitration under Collyer and S ~ i e l b e r g . ~ ~
Although the Collyer deferral doctrine had been extended to
NLRA section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases prior to GardnerD e n ~ e rCollyer
, ~ ~ was subsequently trimmed back to its original
NLRA section 8(a)(5) dimensions in General American Transportation Corp.'O In contrast to the retrenchment of Collyer
34. Id. a t 58. The court also ruled that the burden of proof for establishing that
these conditions were met would be upon the respondent, not the claimant. Id.
35. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
36. Id. a t 55-60.
37. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
38. The NLRB majority concluded that its position was consistent with recent Supreme Court pronouncements in Gardner-Denver and William E. Arnold Co. v.
Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974). In Arnold the Court approvingly quoted
the NLRB's following language from Collyer:
[A]n industrial relations dispute may involve conduct which, a t least arguably,
may contravene both the collective agreement and our statute. When the parties have contractually committed themselves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes during the period of the contract, we are of
the view that those procedures should be afforded full opportunity to function. . . . We believe it to be consistent with the fundamental objectives of
Federal law to require the parties . . . to honor their contractual obligations
rather than, by casting [their] dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their
agreed-upon procedures.
417 U.S. a t 16-17 (quoting Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1971)).
39. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
40. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). In a three-to-two decision, then Chairperson Murphy
cast the crucial vote and wrote in part:
In cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), based on conduct
assertedly in derogation of the contract, the principal issue is whether the
complained-of conduct is permitted by the parties' contract. Such issues are
eminently suited to the arbitral process, and resolution of the contract issue by
an arbitrator will, as a rule, dispose of the unfair labor practice issue. On the
other hand, in cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l)(A),
and 8(b)(2), although arguably also involving a contract violation, the determi-
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pre-arbitral deference, the Spielberg doctrine was recently expanded by the Third Circuit in NLRB u. Pincus Bros.,
Inc.-M~xwell.~~
In Pincus Bros. the court denied enforcement
of an NLRB reinstatement order and held that the NLRB's refusal to defer to an arbitration award, which had ruled that the
employee had been terminated for cause, was an abuse of discret i ~ n . 'The
~ court further held that "it is an abuse of discretion
for the Board to refuse to defer to an arbitration award where
the findings of the arbitrator may arguably be characterized as
not inconsistent with Board policy"4s and that "where there are
two arguable interpretations of an arbitration award, one permissible and one impermissible, the Board must defer to the decision rendered by the arbitrat~r."'~The Third Circuit's decision
native issue is not whether the conduct is permitted by the contract, but
whether the conduct was unlawfully motivated or whether it otherwise interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. In these situations, an arbitrator's resolution of the contract issue will not dispose of the unfair labor practice
allegation. Nor is the arbitration process suited for resolving employee complaints of discrimination under Section 7.
Id. a t 810-11 (footnotes omitted). Murphy did indicate in General American, however,
that she would follow Spielberg and uphold arbitration awards where the employee had
voluntarily submitted to the arbitration or where an NLRB regional office had deferred
to the award pursuant to the prevailing Collyer doctrine. Murphy then joined the two
dissenting Board members of General American in Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228
N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977), to reaffirm the NLRB's deferral to arbitration policy in NLRA
Q 8(a)(5) cases.
41. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 370. The discharged employee in Pincus Bros., according to the arbitrator's decision, was terminated for cause because she had abused working time and had
written and distributed a leaflet that was unfairly critical of employment conditions, the
employer, and the employer's product. While the employee's grievance was pending, she
filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging that she had been discharged for having engaged
in concerted activity. The General Counsel issued a complaint and submitted to the
NLRB the question whether the NLRB should defer to the arbitrator's award. An
NLRB panel decided not to defer since it concluded that the employee had been discharged for having engaged in protected activity. After sending the matter to an administrative law judge for a hearing, the NLRB adopted the administrative law judge's findings and conclusions that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice and
ordered the employee's reinstatement. The NLRB then sought enforcement of its reinstatement order by the Third Circuit. Id. a t 370-71.
43. Id. at 374. The court reasoned that NLRB deference to the arbitral process,
"especially when the award has already been rendered and it is arguably consistent with
Board policy, will effectuate the intent of the parties in the collective bargaining agreement and avoid the time, expense, and inconvenience of duplicative proceedings." Id. In
addition, the court pointed out that when the parties agreed to establish and follow arbitration procedures, they voluntarily accepted the risk that the results of arbitration
might differ from the NLRB's resolution of disputes. Id.
44. Id. at 377. The court went to some length to articulate four reasons why the
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in Pincus Bros. establishes a new high-water mark for the doctrine of deferral. It should be remembered, however, that this
recent hospitable accommodation by one court of appeals is a t
present limited to section 8(a)(l) cases under the NLRA.
In any event, the contours of the deferral doctrine remain in
flux. Spirited debate continues among commentators about the
appropriate role and scope of the deferral do~trine.'~

111. TITLEVII EXCEPTION
TO THE DEFERRAL
DOCTRINE:
Gardner-Denver
The Supreme Court placed an important limit on the expanding doctrine of deferral when it decided Alexander v. Gardner-Denver CO.'~The Court held that an employee's Title VII
right to a trial de novo is not foreclosed because his claim was
earlier submitted to arbitration pursuant to the grievance-arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. In Gardner-Denver, the petitioner, a black who was training as a drill
operator, was discharged for allegedly producing too many defective parts. Petitioner invoked the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective bargaining agreement, which arguably
covered the dispute, to challenge his discharge. Although petitioner first contended in the final pre-arbitration step that his
discharge was racially motivated, the arbitrator nevertheless
ruled-without
reference to the racial discrimination
claim-"that petitioner had been 'discharged for just cause.' ""
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
arbitrator's decision that the employee's conduct constituted unprotected activity was
arguably correct: (I)Employees lose the protection of the NLRA when they make deliberate or malicious false statements, (2) the employee's actions may have constituted unprotected disloyalty, (3)activity is unprotected if it is inconsistent with fundamental
NLRA policy to promote collective bargaining and industrial stability, and (4)the employee was not engaged in protected, concerted activity because she was acting alone. Id.
at 375-77.
45. See, e.g., Christensen, Private Judges, Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in
the Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, in THEFUTUREOF LABORARBITRATION IN AMERICA
49 (J. Correge, V. Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976);Getman, Collyer
Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973);Zimmer, Wired
for Collyer: Rationalizing NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 IND.L.J. 141 (1973).
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
47. Id. at 42. At the arbitration hearing, petitioner's union introduced a letter from
him stating that he was "knowledgeable that in the same plant others have scrapped an
equal amount and sometimes in excess, but by all logical reasoning I . . . have been the
target of preferential discriminatory treatment." Id. A union representative also gave
testimony that the company's customary procedure in the case of unsatisfactory trainee
drill operators was to return them to their former positions. Id.
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which had received petitioner's charge of racial discrimination
prior to the arbitration hearing, subsequently informed petitioner that it had no reasonable cause to believe that a violation
of Title VII had occurred.48 Petitioner's private suit was dismissed by the district court following the granting of the employer's motion for summary j~dgrnent.'~On appeal the Tenth
Circuit affirmed per curium. The Supreme Court in a unanimous
opinion, however, reversed the two lower courts.
There were several conclusions that the Supreme Court
could have reached in Gardner-Denver. It could have affirmed
the Tenth Circuit's opinion, which adopted a preclusion
rule60-i.e., an employee's prior submission of a claim to final
arbitration precludes de novo consideration of the claim in the
federal courts. At the other extreme, the Court could have
adopted a rule ensuring unconditional de novo consideration of
an employee's Title VII claim. Finally, the Court could have selected a compromise position incorporating the deferral doctrine
in either a lax (Spielberg) or a more rigid (Rios) form. Instead,
the Court fashioned a novel approach. Until the last paragraph
of the opinion, every indicator suggested that the Court had totally rejected the deferral doctrine and adopted a pure de novo
consideration rule. Without explanation, however, the Court
simply directed that "[tlhe arbitral decision may be admitted as
evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate? The accompanying footnote, number twenty-one, merely
adds:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an
arbitral decision, since this must be determined in the court's
discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the
collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially
with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral
forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of dis48. Id. at 43. The EEOC later informed petitioner of his right to bring suit in federal district court within 30 days. Id.
49. Id. at 43. The district court, relying upon petitioner's aKidavit, which stated that
he had raised the racial discrimination claim in the arbitration hearing, found that the
claim had been presented to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to petitioner. The
court then held under an election of remedies notion that petitioner was bound by the
arbitration award and precluded from bringing suit under Title VII because he had voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance by arbitration. Id.
50. Id. at 54-55.
51. Id. at 60.
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crimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration
to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord
it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely
one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided
by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But
courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title
VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the
ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is
the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.62

Professor Harry T. Edwards has noted that "[dlespite the
emphasis in Gardner-Denver on maintaining full federal adjudication of Title VII rights, footnote twenty-one seems to offer
lower courts a route to de facto deferral to arbitral awards."6s
However, it is still too early to detect a trend in the federal judiciary on the weight being accorded arbitral decisions under footnote twenty-one.54
An understanding of the Court's analysis and rationale in
Gardner-Denver is essential for the purposes of this Comment
since the central inquiry here is whether the Court's de novo
consideration approach, which allows the arbitration decision to
be admissible as evidence, should also govern statutory rights
arising under FLSA and OSHA. The Court began from the premise that Title VII does not directly address "the relationship
between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery
of collective bargaining agreements."" In the absence of express
congressional guidance, the Court relied on four main considerations in reaching its decision: (1) Congress vested the federal
courts with plenary power for enforcement of Title VII rights,
(2) Congress intended to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination, (3) arbitrators have authority to resolve
52. Id. at 60 n.21. For a detailed analysis of the Court's admissible as evidence doctrine, see Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 ARK.
L. REV.& BARASSOC.J. 129 (1975).
53. Edwards, Labor Arbitration At The Crossroads: The "Common Law of the
Shop" u. External Law, 32 ARB.J. 65, 77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as At the Crossroads].
54. In Strittmatter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 496 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1974),
the Sixth Circuit remanded under Gardner-Denver without referring to footnote 21:
"Alexander requires us to reverse the judgment of the District Court and to remand for
a trial de novo, in which the arbitral award may be admitted in evidence and accorded
such weight as the Court deems appropriate." Id. at 1245. The Fifth Circuit in Jones v.
Supreme Sugar Refinery, 493 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1974), simply remanded by citing
Gardner-Denver and not commenting on the weight to be accorded.
55. 415 U.S. at 47.

372

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I981

only contractual rights, not Title VII substantive rights, even if
such rights are duplicative, and (4) arbitral processes are comparatively inferior to judicial processes in protecting Title VII
rights.
With respect to the first consideration the Court stressed
several times in its opinion that Congress had assigned plenary
powers to the federal courts to secure compliance with Title VII.
Broad remedial powers were entrusted to the federal courts in
part because the EEOC does not possess direct powers of
enf~rcement.~~
Secondly, the Court concluded that because Congress' policy against discrimination was of the "highest priority," its legislation demonstrated a general intent to provide parallel or overlapping remedies." Accordingly, the Court rejected the lower
courts' reliance on the doctrines of election of remedies and
~aiver~~-doctrinesthat necessarily limit the scope of relief
available to a claimant.
As a third consideration the Court determined that an arbitrator's authority extends to only the resolution of contractual
rights, not statutory rights, even if these rights are similar to
those protected under Title VII? In other words, contractual
and statutory rights have "legally independent origins," and the
"distinctly separate nature" of these rights is not removed just
because the same factual setting is involved. The arbitrator's
grant of authority to resolve disputes is rooted solely in the collective bargaining agreement itself and his decision must be
based on a fair interpretation of the terms and application of
that agreement?O
56. Id. at 44. It is beyond the power of the EEOC to adjudicate claims or impose
administrative sanctions. Plenary enforcement powers for Title VII are vested in the
federal courts. 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-5(f), & (g) (1976) authorize federal courts to provide
injunctive relief or other such affirmative action as may be required to remedy the effects
of discriminatory employment practices.
57. Id. at 47. For examples of other statutory relief available, see 42 U.S.C. 5 1981
(1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1871).
58. The Court noted that most courts recognize that the election of remedies doctrine does not apply to suits under Title VII. 415 U.S. at 49 n.11. Furthermore, the Court
ruled, "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." Id.
a t 51.
59. 415 U.S. at 53-54.
60. The Court found support for this conclusion in the writings of Dean Schulman:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-govern-
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These first three factors primarily explain why the Court
elected not to follow the Tenth Circuit's strict preclusion rule in
Title VII cases. Strict preclusion would prevent claimants from
seeking supplemental relief apart from that obtained through
the grievance-arbitration machinery. In addition, the foreclosure
of these parallel avenues of statutory relief would frustrate Congress' purpose in conferring plenary powers upon the federal
courts for the enforcement of Title VII rights.
In the final section of its opinion, the Court developed its
fourth proposition that arbitral processes are comparatively inferior to judicial processes in protecting rights secured by Title
VII. In this last section the Court specifically explained its rejection of a deferral policy. "Arbitral procedures," stated the Court,
"while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the
final resolution of rights created by Title V11."61 An arbitrator's
role is to effectuate the parties' intent, not enforce statutory requirements. The weakness of this conclusion, however, is that
"the tension between contractual and statutory objectives may
be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement contains
provisions facially similar to those of Title V11."62 Having undercut its own argument with this acknowledgment, the Court declared that "other facts . . . render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in $he protection of Title VII
rights."63 In short, these "other facts" include the arbitrator's
special competence relating "to the law of the shop, not the law
of the land."" Although arbitrators may be especially knowledgeable with respect to "industrial relations," courts are better
qualified to deal with "statutory and constitutional issues" as
well as "public law concepts." Moreover, the procedural informality of arbitration, concluded the Court, makes it a "less
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than
the federal courts."66
ment created by and confined to theGparties.He serves their pleasure only, to
administer the rule of law established by their qollective agreement. Schulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.L. REV.999, 1016
(1955).
Id. at 53 n.16.
61. Id. at 56.
62. Id. at 57.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 57.
65. Id. at 58.
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In scrutinizing the Gardner-Denver opinion to determine
whether the Court's holding should be extended to FLSA and
OSHA rights, several points should be kept in mind. First, the
Court acknowledged, but in no way disparaged, the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Most importantly,
apart from all its previous reasoning earlier in the opinion, the
Court stated a t the end that it was "accommodating" federal
policies-specifically "the federal policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment p r a ~ t i c e s . "In
~ ~the Court's judgment, the best accommodation of these two important federal policies was to allow
employees to pursue remedies under both grievance-arbitration
processes and Title VII.
OF ARBITRABILITY
EXTENDS
TO SAFETY
IV. PRESUMPTION
DISPUTES-GatewayCoal

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workerss7 was decided
by the Supreme Court in an eight-to-one decision the same year
Gardner-Denver was decided. As in Gardner-Denver, Justice
Powell wrote for the majority in Gateway Coal. The dispute in
Gateway Coal arose when the coal company reinstated certain
foremen who were suspended for falsifying records indicating
airflow levels in the mine? The miners struck to protest the
safety hazard created by the presence of the reinstated foremen.
Following the union's refusal to arbitrate, the company sought
and obtained from the district court an injunction against the
striking miners. On appeal a divided panel of the Third Circuit
reversed and vacated the injunction. The court of appeals found
that public policy disfavored compulsory arbitration of safety
disputess9 and that in the absence of an express agreement to
submit such disputes to arbitration, "the union had no contractual duty to submit this controversy to arbitration and hence no
#

66. Id. at 59.
67. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
68. The collapse of a ventilation structure, which partially blocked an intake airway,
resulted in an airflow of less than half the normal rate. Nonetheless, even with the reduced airflow, ventilation in the mine still exceeded state and federal requirements. Id.
at 370 & n.1.
69. The court of appeals reasoned that where employees refuse to work because of a
"good faith apprehension of physical danger," no sound reason exists for "requiring them
to subordinate their judgment to that of an arbitrator." 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir.
1972).
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implied obligation not to strike."70
In reversing the Third Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
first determined that the arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement was sufficiently broad to govern the safety
dispute.71 The Court next concluded that the presumption of
arbitrability applies to safety disputes:
We think these remarks [quoted from the Steelworkers TrilogyT2]are as applicable to labor disputes touching the safety of
the employees as to other varieties of disagreement. Certainly
industrial strife may as easily result from unresolved controversies on safety matters as from those on other subjects, with
the same unhappy consequences of lost pay, curtailed production, and economic instability. Moreover, the special expertise
of the labor arbitrator, with his knowledge of the common law
of the shop, is as important to the one case as to the other, and
the need to consider such factors as productivity and worker
morale is as readily apparent.73

The significance of Gateway Coal is that the Court applied
the presumption of arbitrability to safety disputes because it determined that arbitrators, by virtue of their "special expertise"
and "knowledge of the common law of the shop," are especially
well suited for the resolution of safety disputes. However, the
facts in Gateway Coal are readily distinguishable from those in
Gardner-Denver in two important respects: Gateway Coal, unlike Gardner-Denver, involved neither a separate statutory violation nor a prior arbitration award.
V. CASESEXTENDING
Gardner-Denver Beyond Title VII to
FLSA and OSHA: Leone AND N.L. Industries

A. Leone
One of the first cases to extend the Gardner-Denver de novo
consideration rule beyond Title VII to FLSA and OSHA was the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Leone v. Mobil Oil C ~ r p Unlike
. ~ ~ GardnerDenver, Leone was a pre-arbitral award case in which the pri70. 414 U.S. at 373.
71. Id. at 376. The arbitration provision stated in part that the duty to arbitrate
extended to "any local trouble of any kind aris[ing] at the mine." Id.
72. 363 U.S. at 581-82.
73. 414 U.S. at 379.
74. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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mary issue was whether employees were required to exhaust the
grievance-arbitration machinery of their collective bargaining
agreement before bringing suit against their employer for alleged
violation of their statutory rights. The dispute arose when federal inspectors went to a Mobil refinery in response to a union
complaint to investigate conditions at the refinery which allegedly violated OSHA health and safety r e g ~ l a t i o n s . ~ T hfour
e
plaintiff employees accompanied the inspectors during regular
working hours on various phases of the inspection, which lasted
over the course of several weeks. Midway through the inspection, Mobil ceased compensating plaintiffs for their participation
in the i n s p e ~ t i o n Plaintiffs'
union subsequently filed a com.~~
plaint with the Secretary of Labor in which it alleged that the
employer's cessation of payments to the employees because of
their participation in the inspection violated OSHA's ban
against discriminatory treatment of employees who exercise
their OSHA rights? The Assistant Secretary of Labor rejected
the union's claim on the ground that refusal to compensate for
"walkaround" time is neither discriminatory per se under OSHA
nor compensable under FLSA's "hours worked" test.78
Plaintiffs next brought suit in the United States District
75. The inspection was conducted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 5 657 (f)(l) (1976), which
states:
Any employees or representative of employees who believe that a violation
of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an
imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary [of Labor] or his authorized representative of such violation or danger. . . . If upon receipt of such notification the Secretary determines there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, he shall
make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as
soon as practicable.
As a result of the inspection, Labor Department officials cited Mobil for three "serious"
and ninety "non-serious" violations. 523 F.2d at 1154.
76. Mobil management representatives who participated in the inspection, however,
continued to receive pay for the entire period. Id.
77. 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c)(l) (1976) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused
to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified
or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such
,
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
78. 523 F.2d at 1155. The so-called "hours worked" test is derived from the following FLSA provision: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . [a
minimum wage] at the following rates . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 5 206(a) (1976).
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Court for the District of C o l ~ m b i abut
, ~ ~the court granted Mobil's motion for summary judgment, holding that because the
employees' participation was voluntary and primarily for their
own benefit, they were not entitled to compensation under the
"hours worked" test.80 On appeal the District of Columbia Circuit resolved for the first time Mobil's claim that employees
seeking to vindicate statutory rights must first exhaust the
grievance-arbitration procedures specified in the collective bargaining agreement. The court of appeals rejected the exhaustion
argument and then affirmed the district court's decision.
In reaching its decision, the District of Columbia Circuit
noted that the presumption of arbitrability had been expanded
in Gateway Coal to encompass safety disputes, but, disturbingly,
the court never attempted to distinguish Gateway Coal's arbitration requirements from the safety-related dispute in Leone.
Perhaps the court ignored the apparent inconsistency because it
viewed Leone strictly as an FLSA "hours worked" case and discounted the fact that the alleged safety violations had precipitated the wage dispute.
In any event, the court proceeded to limit the exhaustion of
remedies doctrine by relying upon two strands of Supreme Court
authority. The first line of cases relied upon began with U.S.
Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. A r g ~ e l l e s where
, ~ ~ the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule favoring use of grievance-arbitration machinery
but limited its application with respect to individuals. The
Court held there that section 301 of the LMRA neither abrogated nor replaced an individual seaman's statutory claim for
wages;82 rather, section 301 merely provided an optional remstrand of precedent was naturally Gardnere d ~ The
. ~ second
~
79. Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to the provisions of § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). It should be noted that at least one court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, has found that no private right of action exists
under section ll(c)(l) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. $ 660(c) (1976). Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616
F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
80. 523 F.2d at 1155.
81. 400 US. 351 (1971). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (employee permitted to sue directly for wrongful discharge without exhausting grievance procedures
since union had breached its duty of fair representation).
82. 46 U.S.C. $ 596 (1976).
83. The Leone court stated:
What Congress has plainly granted we hesitate to deny. Since the history of $
301 is silent on the abrogation of existing statutory remedies of seamen in the
maritime field, we construe it to provide only an optional remedy to them. We
would require much more to hold that $ 301 reflects a philosophy of legal com-

%
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Denver. The court of appeals, capitalizing on familiar reasoning,
stressed that both the Title VII and FLSA statutory schemes
evidence a congressional intent that such rights be judicially enforced. In addition, the court concluded-much as the Supreme
Court earlier had concluded-that because FLSA, like Title VII,
consists of statutorily created rights, an arbitrator, whose authority stems solely from the agreement between the parties,
"cannot be the final arbiter of rights created by statute.""
Although the court of appeals in Leone drew upon two reputable strands of recent Supreme Court precedent, the court's
decision has been criticized for misplaced reliance on both
Arguelles and Gardner-Denver? The essence of the criticism,
which merits serious consideration, is that in light of Gateway
Coal, where the Supreme Court endorsed arbitration of safety
disputes and extolled the special expertise of arbitrators who are
versed in the common law of the shop, FLSA wage claims are
more closely aligned to Gateway-type safety concerns than to
Title VII discrimination claims. Hence, the argument concludes,
"FLSA wage claims should be subject to the exhaustion of grievances requirement."" It is unnecessary to deal with this argument at present since it merely sets the stage for the analysis to
follow.

B. N.L. Industries
A recent Seventh Circuit case, Marshall u. N.L. Industries,
I ~ C . ,is~ 'in one respect factually closer to Gardner-Denver than
Leone. N.L. Industries and Gardner-Denver both involved the
assertion of statutory rights following a prior arbitration award.
In N.L. Industries an employee who refused to work under al. ~ ~ employee filed a
legedly unsafe conditions was d i s ~ h a r g e dThe
pulsion that overrides the explicit judicial remedy provided by 46 U.S.C. 5 596.
523 F.2d a t 1157 (quoting U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357-58
(1971)).
84. 523 F.2d at 1159.
85. 10 GA. L. REV.843, 853-55 (1976).
86. Id. a t 855.
87. 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
88. The employee worked as a payloader operator and was assigned to load lead
scrap into a melting kettle. As he began to dump the lead scrap, the employee observed
that the dross in the kettle had separated from the side of the pot, thereby exposing to
view the molten metal beneath. Only the week before similar conditions had resulted in
the exploding and spraying of the molten lead toward the employee's enclosed cab. Because he now lacked a windshield and an enclosed cab, the employee feared that an
explosion might again occur and cause him injury. Accordingly, he immediately ceased
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written grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between his union and his employer8@and also filed a complaint
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleging that he had been discharged in violation of OSHA's anti. ~ ~ employee's grievance progressed
discrimination p r o v i s i ~ n The
through final arbitration where he was awarded reinstatement
with "unimpaired seniority" but without back pay.@' The employee accepted the company's offer to return to work.
The Secretary of Labor subsequently filed suit in district
court pursuant to section ll(c)(2) of OSHAea and sought a variety of supplemental remedies." The district court granted the
defendant company's motion for summary judgment, concluding
that despite the controlling precedent of Gardner-Denver, an
exception existed in this case because the employee voluntarily
waived his right to statutory relief by accepting the arbitration
award and returning to work without back pay.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court
that Gardner-Denver controlled the question whether a prior arworking. The employee was suspended-and ultimately discharged-for his refusal to
finish his work with the unprotected payloader after having been ordered to do so by his
supervisor. Id. at 1221-22.
89. The pertinent provision of the collective bargaining agreement stated: "No employee shall be required or permitted by the company to work under unusual conditions
that are dangerous to life, limb or health, nor to work on a machine or use other equipment which does not meet normal safety standards." Id. at 1222 n.4.
90. 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(l) (1976). Section ll(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(2) (1976), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to institute actions to enjoin or redress such
discrimination.
91. The arbitrator concluded that this was the appropriate relief because he determined that the N.L. Industries supervisor had properly checked the heat of the kettle
and decided that the work could proceed safely. 618 F.2d at 1222.
92. The statute provides:
Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of this subsection may, within
thirty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint with the Secretary alleging such discrimination. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall
cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriat& If upon such
investigation, the Secretary determines that the provisions of this subsection
have been violated, he shall bring an action in any appropriate United States
district court against such person. In any such action the United States district
courts shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain violations of paragraph (1) of this subsection and order all appropriate relief including rehiring
or reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay.
29 U.S.C. 8 660(c)(2) (1976).
93. The relief sought included a permanent injunction against further violations,
back pay and vacation pay for the employee, and the posting of a prescribed notice. 618
F.2d at 1222.
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bitration award bars de novo consideration of the claim in the
federal courts. The court likened OSHA to Title VII in that both
legislative schemes were enacted by Congress with the aim of
mobilizing the federal government's resources to attack specific
types of problems that affected workers throughout the country.
Emphasizing the recurring motif that Congress intended individuals to be able to find full vindication of their statutory
rights in the federal judiciary, the court observed:
Enacted after the Supreme Court developed its policies encouraging deference to arbitration in a pure collective bargaining context, the OSHA legislation was intended to create a separate and general right of broad social importance existing
beyond the parameters of an individual labor agreement and
susceptible of full vindication only in a judicial f o r ~ r n . ~

In addition, the Seventh Circuit added a new variation to
the supplemental remedies reasoning by pointing out that an arbitrator cannot always grant the wide range of relief that the
courts can. In N.L. Industries, for instance, the arbitrator could
not order the notice remedies and broad injunctive relief that
the Secretary of Labor sought.
In holding Gardner-Denver controlling, the court of appeals
failed, as in Leone, to consider whether the Gateway presumption of arbitrability over safety disputes should have any bearing
in an OSHA case where an employee's safety is the issue that
prompts the suit. Without regard for or perhaps awareness of
that important question, the court of appeals proceeded to reverse the district court on the waiver question since it concluded
that absent other proof of an intent to waive one's statutory
rights, mere acceptance of an arbitration award is insufhient to
show such intent?

94. Id.
95. The court observed that the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver had concluded
that the mere submission of a grievance to arbitration does not alone constitute waiver.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[aln employee should not have to refuse reinstatement ordered by an arbitrator and thereby risk losing his job permanently in order to
exercise his statutory right to seek judicial relief with all the riska that it may entail." Id.
at 1223.
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VI. CASESLIMITING
THE SCOPE
OF Gardner-Denver to Title
VII: Satterwhite AND Barrentine
A. Satterwhite
Only a few courts of appeals have had occasion to address
the question whether the Gardner-Denver rationale ought to be
extended to statutory rights secured by FLSA and OSHA. The
Tenth Circuit-the same court of appeals that was reversed by
the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver-took the position in
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, I ~ Cthat
.@
Gardner-Den~
ver should be limited to the Title VII context.
Like the courts in Gardner-Denver and N.L. Industries, the
court in Satterwhite considered whether an individual may exercise a statutory right following submission of a claim to final arbitration. The source of controversy in Satterwhite was the employer's decision to eliminate two previously paid fifteen minute
coffee breaks. The employees filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement to recover pay for the extra half hour
.y'ad
The company refused the union's
they were working each@
demand for arbitration on the ground that coffee breaks were
not covered under the labor contract. The union brought suit in
district court and obtained an order compelling the company to
arbitrate. The arbitrator later ruled that the company's unilateral elimination of the coffee breaks was wrongful and directed
that the employees be paid for an additional half hour per day
for the period in question. Contrary to the union's wishes, however, the arbitrator set the rate of pay at straight time, not overtime? Following the company's payment of the award, employee Satterwhite, on behalf of himself and fifty-eight others,
brought suit under section 16(b) of the FLSAee to recover time496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
Id. at 448-49.
Id. at 449.
Section 16(b) provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of
this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the
case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action
to recover such liability may be maintained against any employer (including a
public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and
such consent is fled in the court in which such action is brought. The court in

96.
97.
98.
99.
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and-a-half pay for work in excess of forty hours per week.loO
Based on the authority of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gardner-Denver, which had not yet been reversed by the Supreme
Court, the district court held the arbitration award to be dispositive and dismissed the action.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit prefaced its analysis by
stressing that a statutory claim under FLSA for overtime pay is
clearly distinct from a statutory right protecting against employment discrimination. Following a brief summary of the Supreme
Court's analysis in the recently decided Gardner-Denver case,
the court set forth its reasons why Gardner-Denver should be
distinguished from Satterwhite.
Because FLSA does not include procedures that accentuate
either private enforcement, or overlapping or parallel relief, the
court inferred "a greater reliance on contract remedies and a
lesser emphasis on individual enforcement" under FLSA.lol In
search of further evidence of congressional intent on the subject,
the court turned to the Portal-to-Portal Act of 19471°3 and
found that this legislation was enacted because of Congress' dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of FLSA. The court
seemed to find a certain talismanic charm in the declared congressional policy "to protect the right of collective bargaining
. . . and limit the jurisdiction of the courts."lo8
such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or
plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action. The right provided by this subsection to bring an action by
or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party
plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by
the Secretary of Labor in an action under section 217 of this title in which
restraint is sought of any further delay in the payment of unpaid minimum
wages, or the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,
owing to such employee under section 206 or section 207 of this title by an
employer liable therefor under provisions of this subsection.
29 U.S.C. 3 216(b) (1976).
100. The governing statutory provision states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer
than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. 5 207(a)(l) (1976).
101. 496 F.2d at 450.
102. 29 U.S.C. 95 251-262 (1976).
103. 29 U.S.C. 5 251(b) (1976).
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The court's reliance on this language in the Portal-to-Portal
Act is imaginative but misleading, if not totally unsound. Congress' intent becomes very clear when the legislation is viewed in
its historical context. In a line of important cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the mid-1940's,lW the Court subjected employers and the government to immense liability by ruling that
certain preliminary and incidental employment activities-generally regarded at the time to be non-compensable unless otherwise agreed by the parties-constituted compensable
"workweek" time. The federal courts were immediately flooded
with suits; the claimed and potential liability of private employers and the government was staggering.lo6Congress enacted the
Portal-to-Portal Act for the specific purpose of eliminating the
unexpected, retroactive liabilities. The legislation removed from
both state and federal courts jurisdiction to consider claims
seeking to impose such retroactive liability.lM This historical
perspective shows that Congress' declared purpose was to protect employers' interests in the existing collective bargaining
agreements and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to retroactive liability.
The court of appeals proffered one of its strongest arguments, however, when it stated: "Wages and hours are at the
heart of the collective-bargaining process. They are more akin to
collective rights than to individual rights, and are more suitable
to the arbitral process than Title VII rights."lo7 The Tenth Cir104. Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Tennessee Coal Co.
v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
105. Between July 1,1946, and Jan. 31, 1947, 1,930 actions based on the Tennessee
Coal, Jewell Ridge and Mt. Clemens Pottery cases were commenced in the federal
courts. The combined claims in these actions exceeded five billion dollars. The federal
government's potential liability on War Department cost-plus contracts alone was estimated at 1.4 billion dollars. See H.R. R.EP. NO. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. 3,4,5 (1947); see
also S. REP.NO. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
106. The statute provides:
No court of the United States, of any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, or of the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any
action or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947,
to enforce liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the
employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, under the Walsh-Healey Act, or under
the Bacon-Davis Act, to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to
enforce any liability or impose any punishment with respect to an activity
which was not compensable under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
29 U.S.C. 8 252(d) (1976).
107. 496 F.2d at 451. The court further reasoned: "The ever-present disputes over
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cuit also presented a persuasive argument when it shifted the
focus to balancing competing federal policies. The court noted
that the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver weighed the federal
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discrimination which ranked as one of "highest priority." Arbitration gave way to anti-discrimination policy. The
Satterwhite court did not reach the balancing stage, which
would have pitted the policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes against a policy arguably favoring judicial consideration of
individual FLSA claims, because it concluded that no FLSA forum preference existed for the resolution of wage disputes:
We find nothing in any pertinent legislative history or court
decision to indicate that Congress, by the grant of a right to
private suit under FLSA § 16(b), intended to establish a policy
preference for the determination of a wage dispute in judicial
rather than arbitral proceedings. Indeed, the only policy expression of which we are aware, that contained in the Portalto-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(b), is to the contrary.lo8

The Tenth Circuit concluded its analysis by reaffirming its
apparent preference for a preclusion rule. Although the court in
its summary of the Supreme Court's Gardner-Denver opinion
recognized the separate origin of contractual and statutory
rights, it nevertheless was willing to overlook the independent
origin of those rights provided they arose from the same factual
occurrence.10eThe court apparently favored precluding resort to
wages and hours are readily adaptable to arbitration. Resort to judicial process after
arbitration prolongs the controversy and serves no good purpose when the arbitral and
judicial proceedings arise out of, and must be decided on, the same factual background."
Id. at 451-52.
108. 496 F.2d at 451. The court's reasoning on this point is not persuasive. FLSA
provides for a right to private suit; the right is not qualified or conditioned. Yet the
Tenth Circuit seems to argue that because Congress did not expressly state, as a matter
of policy preference, that it found a judicial forum to be superior to an arbitral forum in
this context, that its expression of intent is somehow less valid. The court does not explain why a statutory provision, clear on its face and not constitutionally infirm, should
not be enforced as Congress intended. Congress is not obligated to explain why it chooses
one course of action over another or over all others. This is especially true in the instant
case where the other course of action, i.e., the use of arbitration, first received the strong
endorsement of the Supreme Court in the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy-some thirteen
years after the FLSA was enacted.
109. The Tenth Circuit stated:
We hold that when a wage dispute is submitted to arbitration in accordance with a collective-bargainingagreement, the employees may not thereafter maintain an FLSA 16(b) suit for recovery on the basis of the same factual
occurrence as that presented to the arbitrator. We are convinced that the pol-
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judicial relief following arbitration because judicial action only
"prolongs the controversy and serves no good purpose when the
arbitral and judicial proceedings arise out of, and must be decided on, the same factual background."l1°

B. Barrentine
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Sat terwhite was recently
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.lll Certiorari has since been granted by the
Supreme Court. In Barrentine, truck drivers brought suit
against their employer and union. Count one of the complaint
was brought under section 16(b) of the FLSA. Count two,
brought under section 301 of the LMRA, consisted of an allegation that the union had breached its duty to fairly represent the
employees in their dispute with the employer.l12 The controversy arose because of the employer trucking company's policy
regarding compliance with United States Department of Transportation regulations governing pre-trip safety inspections.118No
driver received pay for the time spent inspecting his vehicle; furthermore, in the event mechanical defects were discovered, the
trucking company refused to pay the driver for the actual driving time incurred after inspection in taking his truck to the company's repair facility.l14
To challenge this company practice, Barrentine and a fellow
employee, Scates, submitted formal grievances which were eventually processed through final arbitration and rejected by the
icy of Congress, recognized by the Court., favors the arbitration of disputes
over wages and hours in accordance with a collective-bargaining agreement.
The high priority which Congress has given to protection against racial discrimination has no application to a dispute over rate of pay. The reassertion in
a judicial forum of the same wage claim determined in an appropriate arbitration hinders rather than promotes industrial peace, and should not be
permitted.
Id. at 452.
110. Id. at 451-52.
111. 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980).
112. The Eighth Circuit concluded that because count one of the complaint failed,
count two automatically failed as well. Id. at 1202.
113. The Department of Transportation under the authority of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1976), promulgated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. The regulations require, among other things, that drivers inspect specified parts
and accessories before driving their vehicles, 49 C.F.R. 5 392.7 (1979), and that drivers
refrain from driving if mechanical defects are discovered, 49 C.F.R. § 396.4 (1979).
114. 615 F.2d at 1197.
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joint industry-labor grievance committee.l16 Barrentine and
Scates were joined by four other drivers, who had not submitted
grievances, in filing a complaint in the district court. The court
dismissed the suit with respect to all the plaintiffs, holding that
the safety-inspection time dispute was properly submitted to arbitration and fairly decided without a breach of fair representation by the union.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit adopted the Satterwhite distinction between wage and discrimination issues. Accordingly,
the court of appeals concluded that an employee who voluntarily
submits a wage dispute to grievance-arbitration procedures
under a collective bargaining agreement cannot later bring a private suit under the FLSA. Concerning the four plaintiffs who
had not yet submitted grievances, and therefore had not exhausted their remedies before bringing suit, the court merely circumvented the precedent of Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.ll@and
Thompson u. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.l17 These two cases held
that where an employee's claim was protected under the FLSA
and covered under the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement, the employee need not exhaust his contractual
remedies before bringing private suit. Because the trial court
had elected to treat "the case as though each of the named
plaintiffs had actually filed grievances which were considered
and denied,"l18 and because the four drivers' trial counsel did
not object to that approach, the Eighth Circuit merely concluded that Leone and Thompson were not controlling.

VII. EXPAND
OR LIMITTHE SCOPE
OF Gardner-Denver?
The discussion to this point has attempted to set forth the
case authority, highlight various lines of reasoning, and portray
an accurate global view of the controversy over the scope of
Gardner-Denver-all for the purpose of offering an analysis that
115. The parties disagree whether the FLSA claim was presented to and considered
by the grievance committee. The petitioners claim that it was not. "[Tlhere is no indication that any claim under the FLSA was presented to, much less considered by, the
grievance committee." Brief for Petitioners at 5, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980). The respondent in turn, "has not and
does not concede that the FLSA claim of the employees was not submitted to or considered by the Grievance Committee." Brief for Respondent a t 1.
116. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
117. 185 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1971), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 405
U.S. 228 (1972).
118. 615 F.2d at 1201.
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might add some clarity and insight to the resolution of this important matter.
The courts that have ruled to expand the scope of GardnerDenver to FLSA and OSHA casesl1@and the courts that have
ruled to restrict such expansion120 appear to have either missed
or ignored some of the important issues. The courts in Leone
and N.L. Industries, for whatever reasons, failed to confront the
implications raised by the Gateway Coal policy favoring arbitration of safety disputes. The Satterwhite and Barrentine courts,
on the other hand, did not satisfactorily justify their authority
to eliminate by judicial fiat statutorily created rights. It will be
helpful to reconstruct the most compelling positions for each
side by synthesizing some of the strongest arguments propounded by the various courts.
A. Position Favoring Limitation of Gardner-Denver to Title
VII Cases
The desirability of limiting the application of the GardnerDenver rationale to Title VII cases is perhaps best demonstrated
by proposing a two-part balancing test for grievance-arbitration
cases that involve statutory rights. The test would balance the
federal policies underlying arbitration against the federal policies underlying the statutory scheme in question. The first prong
of the test would be to identify the specific federal policy (or
policies) underlying the statute. The second prong would focus
on whether an arbitral or a judicial forum would be better suited
for achievement of the stated federal policy. With this information a court could balance the federal policy favoring arbitration
of labor disputes with the stated federal policy underlying the
statute. In those instances where a court determines that the
federal policy underlying the statute would be best promoted
and protected in an arbitral forum, the inquiry would cease and
either a deferral or preclusion rule would be adopted. Where a
court determines, however, that the federal policy underlying a
statutory scheme is better promoted and protected in a judicial
rather than an arbitral forum, the court would then decide
119. Marshall v. N.L.Industries, Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980); Leone v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
120. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 615 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980); Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d
448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
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whether Congress deemed either the statutorily based policy or
the arbitration policy to be relatively more important than the
other so as to warrant controlling stature.
The facts and analysis in Gardner-Denver provide a useful
example for application of this test. The Supreme Court there
identified the two competing federal policies as that favoring arbitration of labor disputes and that against discriminatory employment practices.121 The Court determined that "arbitration
makes a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII
issues than the federal courts."122 Factors such as the presence
of constitutional and statutory issues, the need to refer to public
law concepts, and the procedural formalities of judicial proceedings all persuaded the Court that a judicial forum is the superior
method for resolving Title VII matters. Clearly, these two federal policies were at odds with one another, and the Court in its
attempt to "accommodate" the two policies was likely influenced
by its earlier determination that Congress considered its "policy
against discrimination to be of the 'highest priority.' "128 Indeed,
the Court's sincere desire to accommodate the two policies is evidenced by the "admissible as evidence" rule found in footnote
twenty-one of its opinion.
Quite a different result arguably could be reached, however,
when the same test is applied to an OSHA rather than a Title
VII case. In identifying the federal policy behind OSHA, Congress stated in part: "The Congress declares it to be its purpose
and policy . . to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources
. ."lU The object of
providing safe and healthful working conditions is arguably most
effectively furthered by resort to arbitration. This conclusion
draws its support from the Supreme Court's opinion in Gateway
Coal where it held that the presumption of arbitrability applies
to safety disputes. In so holding, the Court emphasized the suitability of arbitration for the resolution of labor disputes "touching the safety of the employees" because of "the special expertise of the labor arbitrator, with his knowledge of the common
law of the shop."126 When this determination that the arbitral

.

..

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

415 U.S. at 59.

Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 47.
29 U.S.C. 5 651(b) (1976).
414 US. at 379.
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forum best advances the federal policy favoring safe and healthful working conditions is coupled with the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, the consequence is the adoption of a deferral or preclusion rule.
Application of this test to FLSA cases would presumably require a result similar to that reached in OSHA cases. In its
statement of findings under the FLSA, Congress said:
The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States; ( 2 ) burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of
goods in commerce.126

Congress proceeded to declare its policy of correcting and eliminating as rapidly as practicable the conditions referred to in its
findings.12' Moreover, a later congressional policy expression in
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947128amended the FLSA in part
"to protect the right of collective bargaining; and . . . to define
and limit the jurisdiction of the courts."129 The federal policy
favoring improvement of substandard labor conditions also appears to be an objective that is within the special competence of
labor arbitrators. If labor disputes touching the safety of employees are well-suited to arbitration, then a fortiori, labor disputes touching wages and hours, which are fundamental provisions in all collective bargaining agreements, are all the more
appropriate for resolution through arbitration. In this case, as in
OSHA cases, there is no conflict between federal policies; on the
contrary, the federal policy favoring improvement of substandard labor conditions and the federal policy favoring arbitration
of labor disputes combine to mandate the conclusion that arbitration be employed to resolve FLSA disputes.
126.
127.
128.
129.

29 U.S.C.

5 202(a) (1976) (emphasis added).

Id. at 5 202(b).
29 U.S.C. $5 251-262 (1976).
251(b).

Id. at
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It may be contended that this balancing of federal policies
approach fails to consider the independent statutory basis for
FLSA and OSHA rights. Admittedly, a preclusion rule does bar
the exercise of individual statutory rights. A strict deferral rule,
however, such as the one proposed by the Fifth Circuit in Rios v.
Reynolds Metal Co.,lM would merely suspend an individual's
statutory rights in pre-arbitral cases until grievance-arbitration
processes had been exhausted, or foreclose the exercise of statutory rights only where a prior arbitration award, meeting particularized requirements of fairness, had been awarded. Such a
strict deferral rule would preserve scarce judicial resources, protect the policies underlying the grant of the statutory rights, and
reserve for labor arbitrators those matters peculiarly within the
domain of their specialized competence.
In summary, the position favoring restriction of GardnerDenver to Title VII cases relies upon a two-step balancing test.
This test first identifies the federal policy underlying the statutory scheme in question and then determines whether a judicial
or an arbitral forum is best suited for fulfillment of that statutory policy. When this test is applied to disputes arising under
FLSA or OSHA, arbitration accompanied by a strict deferral
rule emerges as the better method for resolving such conflicts.

B. Position Favoring Expansion of Gardner-Denver to FLSA
and OSHA Cases
The primary reason for extending Gardner-Denver to FLSA
and OSHA cases is the independent origin of these statutorily
created rights. The language of the FLSAlS1and OSHAlS2provisions creating procedures for vindication of individual rights in
federal district courts clearly evidences a congressional intent to
provide such statutory rights. Furthermore, no FLSA or OSHA
provision, either express or implied, states that federal courts
should refrain from granting jurisdiction either permanently (by
preclusion) or temporarily (by deferral) in cases where violations
of these statutory rights have allegedly occurred.lMEven though
130. 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972).
131. 29 U.S.C. 5 216(b) (1976).
132. 29 U.S.C. 8 660(c) (1976).
133. It has been argued by the Tenth Circuit that the language in the Portal-toPortal Act, 29 U.S.C. $5 251-262 (1976), provides for the protection of collective bargaining as well as the definition and limitation of federal court jurisdiction. Satterwhite v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
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it may be claimed-albeit not necessarily accurately-that judicial resources are conserved through arbitration or that arbitrators are better equipped than judges in some areas of expertise,
the fact remains that arbitrators possess no authorization to adjudicate statutory rights. As the Supreme Court correctly noted
in Gardner-Denver, the arbitrator's "source of authority is the
collective-bargaining agreement" and his "task is to effectuate
the intent of the parties."lS4 Under the FLSA and OSHA statutory schemes, by contrast, federal district courts receive their
grant of authority from enacted legislation and it is their task to
effectuate the intent of Congress.
In addition to the fact that statutory rights are of independent legal origin, de novo consideration of such rights is essential because judicial remedies may provide a broader range of
relief to secure these important rights. Even where a prior arbitration award has been granted, judicial remedies may be justified to fairly "supplement" the relief awarded. For example, the
notice remedies and broad injunctive relief granted in Marshall
v. N.L. Industries, Inc.lL6could not have been imposed by the
arbitrator.
Finally, it should be recognized that the statutory rights
created under FLSA and OSHA are individual, not collective,
rights. These statutory rights were specifically created to protect
individuals, not to influence union-employer relations. It may be
true that the alleged violation that gives rise to the exercise of
statutory rights affects many workers, and therefore group
representation could be effective; but the fact remains that
Congress granted individual workers the opportunity to seek
vindication of their rights regardless of action taken by any
union.
Accordingly, it may be claimed that such language at least implies a congressional intent
that federal courts refrain from granting jurisdiction in FLSA cases. Viewed in its historical context, however, it is clear that the Portal-to-Portal legislation was enacted specifically to exempt employers and the government from a tremendous, unexpected retroactive liability which, if imposed, would have crippled this country's economy. The
limitation of federal court jurisdiction was aimed at preventing retroactive, not prospective liability. If Congress had intended to prohibit prospective liability, it assuredly
would not have eliminated federal court jurisdiction only with respect to certain FLSA
claims arising prior to May 14, 1947. See 29 U.S.C. $ 252(a) (1976). The amended FLSA
retains the right for individual employees to bring private causes of action.
134. 415 U.S. at 53.
135. 618 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980).
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C. The Better Position: Extend Gardner-Denver to FLSA
and OSHA Cases
The juxtaposition of the two views regarding de novo consideration of FLSA and OSHA rights serves to accentuate the
complexity of the issues and the sound arguments that support
each side. Some of the current commentary in the field has criticized the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-DenverlS6and
the District of Columbia Circuit's decisionls7in Leone v. Mobil
Oil Corp.lM Despite the persuasiveness of those criticisms, the
commentators fail to explain on what grounds the federal judiciary would be justified in abrogating individual statutory rights
that were expressly and validly created by Congress. In the absence of such explanation, the better position is that GardnerDenver and Leone were correctly decided and, furthermore, that
de novo considerations of FLSA and OSHA rights is the appropriate and prudent course to follow.
In addition to the central argument that no justification
exists for abrogating statutorily created individual rights, other
reasons support de novo consideration of statutory rights as the
better position. Professor Feller has noted several obvious
problems with collective bargaining that weigh in favor of individual statutory rights. First, the majority of American workers
are not presently union members and thus lack union representation. Secondly, experience demonstrates that individual and
minority interests are not always protected by unions. Finally,
society and its elected representatives may deem some interests
to be too fundamental to be entrusted to private collective
bargaining.la@
Other commentators have advanced the argument that the
adjudication of statutory rights by arbitrators will distort or diminish the development of public law rights.140 Harry T. Ed136. Oppenheim, Gateway & Alexander, Whither Arbitration?, 48 TUL.L. REV.973,
986-88 (1974); Comment, Federal Courts-Labor Arbitration-Employment Discrimination-Federal Courts as Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28 RUT.L. REV.162,
189-90 (1974).
137. 10 GA.L. REV.843 (1976).
138. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
139. Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, in n$ FUTURE
OF ARBITRATION
IN AMERICA
83, 87-88 (American Arbitration Association 1976).
140. Christensen, Private Judges-Public Rights: The Role of Arbitration in the
IN
Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, in THEFUTURE OF ARBITRATION
AMERICA
49 (J. Correge, V. Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976); At the Crossroads, note 53
supra.

.
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wards has concluded that arbitration is "not a suitable forum for
the disposition of Title VII or any other important public law
issues."141 Edwards based his conclusion on the results of a survey taken of two hundred members of the National Academy of
arbitrator^:'^^
The evidence as to whether and how many arbitrators are professionally competent to decide legal issues in cases involving
claims of employment discrimination is at best mixed. Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that most arbitrators are professionally competent to decide such issues, the nature of the
arbitration process often will not allow for full and adequate
consideration of an employee's Title VII rights. Finally, the evidence from the survey suggests that even when arbitrators are
professionally competent to decide legal issues and when the
arbitration process is adequate to allow for full consideration of
legal questions arising pursuant to Title VII, still many arbitrators believe that they have no business interpreting or applying
a public statute in a contractual grievance dispute.148

This notion that "[plublic law is for public tribunals to define""' was recognized by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver when it stated that arbitration is a less appropriate forum
for resolution of Title VII rights because the primary responsibility for resolution of constitutional and statutory issues lies
with the courts.14sAlthough OSHA and FLSA rights may not
involve the constitutional issues that Title W rights raise, they
nonetheless touch important statutory issues that "frequently
can be given meaning only by reference to public law conc e p t ~ . "Edwards
~ ~ ~ correctly points out that two principal dangers arise when arbitrators undertake to decide issues of public
law: "The first is that they may be wrong. The second is that
their errors, if honored by a public tribunal out of deference to
arbitration, may distort the development of precedent."14'
The concern over arbitrators deciding issues of public law is
heightened in light of the emerging doubt as to the advantages
141. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 78 (emphasis added).
142. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 2 8 ANNUAL
~ ~ MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS
55-92 (BNA,
Inc. 1975).
143. Id. at 82.
144. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 91.
145. 415 U.S.at 56, 57.
146. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
147. At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 90.
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of arbitral versus judicial proceedings. A number of commentators are marshalling convincing evidence to dispel some of the
traditional notions concerning the efficacy and desirability of arbitration. One distinguished critic, Paul R. Hays, asserts that
l ~ ~those of Archibald
neither the writings of Dean S c h u l ~ n a nnor
Cox,14@
which were relied upon by Justice Douglas in writing the
Steelworkers Trilogy opinions,'" actually provide authority for
the propositions on arbitration set forth in those cases.lS1Hays
states the thesis of his book as follows:
It is the submission of this book that there is no authority to
support the view of arbitration adopted in the Steelworkers
cases. There have been no extensive studies of the arbitration
process that would establish the validity of the propositions
advanced in those cases. While, with overwhelming modesty,
the Court attributed to the arbitrators enormously superior expertise in cases arising under collective agreements, the Court
impliedly claimed for itself an extensive knowledge and understanding of the arbitration process-a knowledge and understanding which the Court could hardly have in light of the
148. See Schulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Hmv. L.
REV.999 (1955).
149. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAW.L. REV.1482,1498-99
(1959).
150. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960);United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960);United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
151. Specifically, Hays contends:
Dean Schulman's Holmes lecture is cited in the Steelworkers cases to support a number of propositions with respect to arbitration. A careful reading of
the passages cited will reveal, I believe, that, favorable as Schulman was to the
arbitration process, his comments do not support the propositions for which
they are cited. Nor can Schulman's lecture be properly cited in connection with
the holdings of the Steelworkers cases. For the Court's remarks on the nature
of the collective agreement and on arbitration are incidental to the holding
that agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards are fully enforceable in the
federal courts, while central to Schulman's thesis of the acceptability of arbitration awards was the submission that arbitration agreements and awards
should not be enforceable in the courts.

....

If the attitude toward labor arbitration which characterizes the Steelworkers cases finds little or no support in Schulman's writing or in his position, the
other authority on whom principal reliance is placed, Professor Archibald Cox,
affords even less ground for the result. His writings on the subject, if read in
their entirety, not only do not support the Court's position, they demonstrate
that Cox takes a position contrary to that of the Court in several important
respects.
P. HAYS,LABORARBITRATION
7-9 (1966).
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In persuasive fashion, Hays attacks the widely circulated
beliefs that parties select arbitrators on the basis of their special
competence,1s3 that arbitrators possess particular expertise,lS4
and that the cost and time savings of the arbitral process far
exceed those of judicial proceedings.1ss The soundness of Hays'
conclusions are buttressed by those of Edwards and others.'"
Finally, to convincingly argue that de novo consideration of
FLSA and OSHA rights is the better position, satisfactory explanations must be given for two arguments. The first argument
is the equitable one articulated by the district court in GardnerDenver, where it reasoned that it would be unfair to allow an
employee to submit his claim to both arbitral and judicial forums and then bind only the employer to the arbitral award.
The court refused to "accept a philosophy which gives the employee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one,"
and thought an employee's later resort to a judicial forum would
undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate, thereby sounding "the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts."lm
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's reasoning
since it concluded that " 'a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to
The
submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration.' "lm
Court further observed that the benefits derived by employers
from no-strike provisions are so valuable that they offset
whatever costs may be encountered by allowing employees an
arbitral remedy in addition to relief granted pursuant to their
statutory rights.
Only time and closer examination will reveal whether the
reasoning of the district court or that of the Supreme Court is
correct. It is true that back pay, court costs, and attorneys fees
provisions under FLSA and OSHA might induce more employees to exercise their statutory rights,'" but it is also true that
Id. at 9.
Id. at 37-39.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 60.
At the Crossroads, supra note 53, at 92-93.
346 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1971).
415 U.S. at 55 (quoting Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
(1970)).
See 29 U.S.C. $ 216(b) (1976) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c)(2) (1976) (OSHA).
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there is little evidence to suggest that employers are moving in
the wake of the Gardner-Denver decision to delete arbitration
clauses from their collective bargaining agreements.
The second argument to be addressed is that the Gateway
Coal presumption of arbitrability of safety disputes extends to
many OSHA and FLSA cases. The simple answer is that Gateway Coal is distinguishable on its facts. Since no statutory rights
were involved in that case, it should not stand as a bar to de
novo adjudication of OSHA rights.
For these reasons, de novo consideration of statutory rights
is the sounder position in terms of both law and policy. Consequently, if the extension of the Gardner-Denver rationale to
FLSA and OSHA rights is the better position, then the logical
conclusion would be to apply the Gardner-Denver holding with
its accompanying "admissible as evidence" caveat to FLSA and
OSHA cases involving arbitration awards. The arguments favoring arbitration of wage, hours, health, or safety disputes may
sway judges to in fact accord great weight to arbitral decisions
that provide adequate due process protections and evidence full
and accurate consideration of an employee's statutory rights. On
the other hand, in pre-arbitral cases involving statutory rights,
de novo consideration could be allowed without requiring an employee to exhaust all other remedies. A necessary adjunct would
be the elimination of the Collyer doctrine to the extent that it
requires deferral of cases involving FLSA and OSHA rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes has
become deeply engrained in the fiber of American labor relations. The NLRB has promoted arbitration by adopting liberal
deferral standards in both pre-arbitral and post-arbitral cases.
Undoubtedly, arbitration would have continued as the preferred
method for resolving most labor-related disputes if the Supreme
Court had not trimmed back the contours of the presumption of
arbitrability in Gardner-Denver. The Gardner-Denver holding
rests on the following propositions: (1)Congress vested the federal courts with plenary power to enforce the provisions of Title
VII, (2) Congress intended to provide individuals with overlapping remedies, (3) arbitrators possess no authority to adjudicate
statutory rights, and (4) a judicial forum is superior to an arbitral forum for the protection of such rights.
In the absence of definitive Supreme Court statements re-
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garding statutory rights other than Title VII rights, it remains
uncertain whether the Court will also permit independent de
novo consideration of FLSA and OSHA rights. The question
whether to extend or limit the Gardner-Denver rationale is a
very difficult one. Sound legal and policy considerations support
each side. Nonetheless, the better position is to expand Gardner-Denver and allow de novo consideration in federal courts of
FLSA and OSHA rights. This is the more prudent course for
several reasons. First, Congress expressly created these individual causes of action and has authorized the federal judiciary to
protect them, not to abrogate or qualify them. In addition, these
statutorily created rights are strictly individual and not collective in nature, which means that they may be vindicated independent of union action. Also, because of the importance of the
public law concepts and statutory issues that exist in many
FLSA and OSHA cases, a judicial forum is a more suitable forum for the resolution of such matters. Finally, the efficacy of
arbitration as a vehicle of dispute resolution is being seriously
questioned because of mounting concerns about the expense and
duration of the arbitral process as well as the competence of arbitrators. Wisdom dictates that these questions be carefully investigated and resolved before individual statutory rights are
impaired.

John A. Adarns

